Woeful Legal Definition
Definition of the sad adjective of the Oxford Advanced Learner`s Dictionary 4 See, for example, Nouveau Petit Robert`s definition, 1998: „unjust and cruel treatment inflicted with relentlessness”. The items listed here are generally accepted, but certainly not without problems. See, for example, on human harm, Andrew Shacknove, Who is a refugee?, Ethics 1985, 274-284, 279 f. Unjust – persecution under the Convention is by definition discriminatory, as we have seen; When you sigh miserably, „I miss my friend who moved,” you speak in a voice full of sadness and desire. And if you`re a high school graduate and don`t even speak rudimentary Spanish, you can say you lack foreign language skills. The meaning „sad” is the older of the two, but the meaning „terrible” is slightly more common. Deplorable and woe are rooted in the old English lament wa! 2 See David Martin, Gender cases: doubts and questions, in: IARLJ, The Changing Nature of Persecution, 2000, 102-116, pp. 102 et seq., where this term refers to the definition of refugee. 18A gap of this magnitude is clearly unacceptable when applying a universal definition.
As Lord Steyn pointed out in Adan and Aitseguer: (14) 8These indications are certainly useful. They help to make some basic distinctions and structure the analysis. Nevertheless, as more than fifty years of debate over the correct interpretation of the refugee definition show, they leave much room for different interpretations. 5In the second part of the article, I will continue this discussion by focusing on a more specific definitional issue: the requirement that persecution must be a particularly „severe” form of harm. I believe this is where refugee lawyers` ambivalence about the vagueness of the term finds its most significant expression. If you do something in a way that expresses how sad or sad you feel, you do it miserably. You can also use this adverb for things that are really poorly done, like your miserably sloppy cake decorations. 40These differences are remarkable. They are clearly rooted in different legal concepts regarding the appropriate role of human rights instruments in interpreting the notion of persecution: vague reference or complete „colonization” of refugee law by human rights law? 41 Moreover, they appear to reflect a deeper concern that an overly principled definition would deprive the notion of pursuit of its necessary flexibility. In other words, the debate on which „human rights-based approach” is the best solution is the best place to confront the two conflicting aspirations I outlined above: coherence and flexibility. Despite a token universal interest in the merits of a coherent, principled approach, it seems that for many in the refugee rights community, the lack of definition is not so „deplorable” after all. 13But at the same time, the openness of the refugee definition on this crucial point makes them vulnerable to restrictive interpretations and even manipulation.
We must not lose sight of the fact that refugee status is an asset in migration control.8 The willingness of industrialized countries to grant exemption from migration control has diminished considerably with the end of the Cold War and the consequent sharp increase in migratory pressure.9 The impact on how the term „persecution” is interpreted and applied, are substantial. An example will suffice here. 22 As we can see, in many respects the concept of persecution no longer suffers from a „deplorable lack of definition” in refugee law. We now know that persecution can come from the authorities or even from private parties, at least as long as the authorities are unable or unwilling to provide effective protection against them. And we know that even though the „commandment of segregation” is still in use in many countries of asylum, „persecution” is a form of harassment that can be directed against an individual, a group, a population, as long as it is associated with a common determining characteristic such as race, religion or political opinion. However, the problem of definition par excellence remains: what is persecution under refugee law? What types of damage are severe enough to fall within the scope of this term? 9I would like to present here the advantage of indeterminacy. In a way, the vagueness of the concept of persecution gives the definition of refugee an indispensable element of flexibility. 1 Jean-Pierre Cavaillé explains the purpose and purpose of this workshop and postulates that the notion of persecution suffers from a „deplorable lack of definition”. If this were unconditionally true, international refugee law would be in danger. A non-derogable violation of civil and political rights is in itself serious enough to fall within the term „persecution”. These rights include, for example, the right to life, the prohibition of torture and the right to legal personality; 14In the 1980s and 1990s, at a time when forced migration was mainly triggered by civil wars and the collapse of state organizations, authorities in countries of asylum began to strictly enforce a requirement of „individualized” persecution, i.e. the requirement for the asylum seeker to provide evidence that he or she was „targeted” for persecution or that he or she is „at greater risk” than similarly situated persons.10 This interpretation of the refugee definition is clearly different.
The Convention`s requirement that persecution must be related to factors such as race or religion makes no numerical distinction: the affected group may consist of a handful of individuals or an entire population – such as European Jews, who were the model of the authors of the Convention for a refugee population.11 7Other elements of definition can be drawn from dictionaries. who are the custodians of the „ordinary meaning” of words. The dictionary definitions of the word „persecution” are, of course, not entirely consistent. However, they all highlight four generally accepted characteristics of persecution. Persecution is a type of harm that is4 2It would be at risk because the term „persecution” is central to the universal definition of refugee in the 1951 Geneva Convention (GC).1 Article 1A of the GC defines a refugee as a person who has a well-founded fear of being „persecuted”.